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REAL PROPERTY LAW

New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, grants
Yellowstone injunction after requisite time period expires
New York case law provides that a landlord may promulgate
new rules and regulations for his or her building if the rules and
regulations are uniformly applied to all tenants and are inherently "reasonable."' A new rule or regulation may not, however,
unilaterally modify the terms of a tenant's current lease in the
absence of consideration unless such change is "in writing and
signed by the party against whom it is sought to [be] enforce[d]
....
" If a landlord unilaterally modifies a lease and a commercial

' See Thousand Island Park Ass'n v. Tucker, 173 N.Y. 203, 212-13, 65 N.E. 975,
977-78 (1903) (stating new regulations may be validly established if they are reasonable and consistent with those at time leases were made); Opoliner v. Joint
Queensview Hous. Enter., Inc., 11 A.D.2d 1076, 1076, 206 N.Y.S.2d 681, 682 (2d
Dep't 1960) (suggesting that reasonableness is required for establishing new rules);
I JOSEPH RASCH, NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT INCLUDING SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS § 15:46, at 713 (3d ed. 1988) (stating well settled principle that "rules
and regulations, imposed during the [lease] term pursuant to the reserved right so
to do, to be valid and enforceable must be reasonable"); see also John A. Humbach,
Landlord Control of Tenant Behavior:An Instance of Private EnvironmentalLegislation, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 223, 309 (1976) (discussing reasonableness as interpreted by courts).
2 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1103 (McKinney 1989).
Disguising a unilateral
lease modification as a "new building rule" also has been held unenforceable. See La
Coquille of Westhampton Beach, Inc. v. Robinson, 48 A.D.2d 633, 634, 368 N.Y.S.2d
195, 197 (1st Dep't 1975) (holding unwritten building rule which prohibited overnight guests without presence of tenant unreasonably restricted use and occupancy
of apartment for dwelling purposes); see also North Broadway Estates, Ltd. v.
Schmoldt, 147 Misc. 2d 1098, 1101, 559 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (Yonkers City Ct. 1990)
(holding building rule unenforceable because it unilaterally modified an express
provision in lease without obtaining compliance with amended provisions).
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tenant is served with a Notice of Default based on the modification, the tenant may apply for Yellowstone injunctive relief.' A
3 The purpose of a Yellowstone injunction is to allow commercial
tenants, in
danger of lease termination, to toll the cure period pending a determination on the
merits. See 2 RASCH, supra note 1, § 23:53, at 218. A Yellowstone injunction preserves the status quo until such determination on the merits by prohibiting a landlord from exercising his right to terminate the lease due to the default during the
pendancy of the action. See, e.g., First Nat'l. Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping
Ctr., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630, 637, 237 N.E.2d 868, 870-71, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724-25
(1968); see also Sportsplex of Middletown, Inc., v. Catskill Reg'l Off-Track Betting
Corp., 633 N.Y.S.2d 588, 588 (2d Dep't 1995) (discussing purpose and effect of Yellowstone injunctions); Titleserv, Inc., v. Zenobio, 210 A.D.2d 311, 313-14, 619
N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (2d Dep't 1994) (discussing purpose and necessity of Yellowstone
injunctions); Heavy Cream, Inc. v. Kurtz, 146 A.D.2d 672, 673, 537 N.Y.S.2d 183,
184-85 (2d Dep't 1989) (recognizing need to preserve rights of lessees to cure in order to prevent forfeiture of substantial property interests in lease).
Requests for Yellowstone injunctive relief must be made in the supreme court
because the civil court does not have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. See 2
RASCH, supra note 1 § 23:53, at 218-19. Once the Supreme Court makes a judgment
on the merits, the injunctive stay terminates. If the tenant loses, he or she must either cure the default within the remaining cure period or the lease will terminate
and the tenant can legally be evicted. Id. at 219.
A tenant seeking a Yellowstone injunction must establish that: 1) it holds a
commercial lease, 2) it has received from the landlord a notice of default, a notice to
cure, or a threat of termination of the lease, 3) the application for a temporary restraining order was made prior to the termination of the lease, and 4) it has the desire and ability to cure the alleged default by any means short of vacating the
premises. In Re Langfur, 198 A.D.2d 355, 356, 603 N.Y.S.2d 576, 577 (2d Dep't
1993).
In Long Island Gynecological Services [hereinafter LIGS], the landlord's main
contention was that the tenant's application for a Yellowstone injunction was untimely because it was filed after the landlord served the Notice of Termination
thereby divesting the court of its power to grant a Yellowstone injunction. Long Island Gynecological Servs., P.C. v. 1103 Stewart Ave. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 638
N.Y.S.2d 959, 961-62 (2d Dep't 1996); see also Rappa v. Palmieri, 203 A.D.2d 270,
270, 610 N.Y.S.2d 286, 286 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding motion for Yellowstone relief
untimely because tenant did not move for said relief until after termination notice
was served); S.E. Nichols, Inc. v. American Shopping Ctrs., Inc., 115 A.D.2d 856,
858, 495 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (3d Dep't 1985) (stating there is no basis for preliminary
injunctions sought after termination notice is served); Health 'N Sports, Inc. v.
Providence Capitol Realty Group, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 884, 885, 428 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289
(2d Dep't 1980) (holding failure of tenants to obtain a stay of curative period divested court of its power to grant Yellowstone injunction).
The tenant argued that paragraph 13 of the lease specifically allowed the tenant more than 30 days to cure if a default could not be cured within 30 days and the
tenant thereafter made a good faith effort to cure such default. Appellant's Brief at
42, Long Island Gynecological Servs., 638 N.Y.S.2d 959 (No. 95-10358, 95-10986)
[hereinafter Appellant's Brief] (citing to Para. 13 of Lease); see also Glicker v. Williams, 103 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (1st Dep't 1950) (holding tenants should be given reasonable time to cure default when tenant initiates appropriate steps to cure violation before summary proceedings are instituted); Humane Soc'y v. Joad Enter., Inc.,
65 Misc. 2d 8, 10, 316 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970)
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Yellowstone injunction effectively tolls the running of the commercial tenant's cure period so that in the event of an adverse
determination on the merits, the tenant is given further opportunity to cure the defect and avoid forfeiture of a valuable commercial leasehold.4 In the recent case of Long Island Gynecological Services, P.C. v. 1103 Stewart Avenue Associates Limited
Partnership,'the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a landlord could not unilaterally modify an abortion clinic tenant's lease so as to prohibit
the performance of abortions in the building. The court reasoned that the modification was not "reasonably prescribed" because abortion performance was a permissible activity under the
original lease.7 The promulgation of the new rule, therefore,
unilaterally modified the original terms of the lease in violation
of contract law.' Additionally, the court granted the tenant a
Yellowstone injunction based upon the terms of the lease and the
unique circumstances of the case even though the tenant filed for
injunctive relief after the cure period had expired and the lease
was terminated.'
In Long Island Gynecological Services (hereinafter "LIGS"),
the Long Island Gynecological Services (hereinafter "the clinic"),
a medical company which provides pregnancy terminations, obtained a commercial lease for space at 1103 Stewart Avenue,
Garden City, New York." The lease was for a period of eleven
(recognizing that when tenant seeks to cure default landlord should cooperate to
avoid forfeiture).
The tenant argued that a good faith effort was made to comply with both of the
landlord's new rules by hiring a security guard, posting requisite signs, and installing security cameras. See Appellant's Brief at 43. The tenant also argued that the
landlord frustrated its ability to cure by banning the clinic's security guard from patrolling the hallways and delaying installation of the tenant's security cameras. Id.
(citing to Transcript of Plenary Hearing, dated May 17 and June 6-7, 1995, at 15657) [hereinafter Hearing Tr.].
For a comprehensive overview of New York law on Yellowstone injunctions, see
generally 2 RASCH, supra note 1, § 23:53, at 216-19.
See supra note 3.
638 N.Y.S.2d 959 (2d Dep't 1996).
'Id. at 963.
7 Id. at 962.
'Id. at 963; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
'Long Island Gynecological Servs., 638 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
'0 Appellants Brief at 4 (citing to Paras. 2 and 40 of Lease). The clinic initially
entered into the lease with Sackson Development Corporation, a non-party to the
present litigation. Id. (citing affidavit of Ronald J. Morey, sworn to on March 3,
1995) [hereinafter Mar. 3 Morey Aflt.]. Approximately one year later, the current
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years with an option to renew for two additional five-year
terms." The lease contained a "default provision" which explained the rights and responsibilities of both parties in the
event of an alleged default by the tenant.' A "use" clause was
also included in the lease which allowed the tenant to occupy the
premises as medical offices." At the commencement of the subject lease, the clinic expressly informed the original landlord, in
writing, that the leased premises would be used to offer an
"array of gynecological services" including pregnancy termina14
tions.
Tension between the clinic and the other tenants of the
building began immediately. The other tenants regularly complained to the landlord that clients of the clinic were constantly
loitering throughout the building," invading their office space,"
landlord, Ronald J. Morey [hereinafter the landlord], party to the present action,
acquired the building subject to the tenant's lease and thereby accepted the rights
and responsibilities of the lessor under the lease. Id. at 5. The landlord conceded
that he had reviewed the tenant's lease and that he personally witnessed antiabortion protests before final purchase of the building. Id. (citing to Hearing Tr. at
5-7).
" Id. at 4 (citing paras. 2 and 40 of Lease).
2Paragraph
13 of the lease provided that in the event of a default by the tenant, the landlord:
[mlay give [tenant] notice of such default, and if [tenant] does not cure any
basic rent or additional rent default within fifteen (15) days or other default within thirty (30) days after giving of such notice (or if such other default is of such nature that it cannot be completely cured within thirty (30)
days and thereafter proceeds with reasonable diligence and in good faith to
cure such default), then [Landlord] may terminate this Lease on not less
than ten (10) days' additional notice to [tenant], and on the date specified
in said notice, [tenant's] right to possession of the Demised Premises shall
cease, and [tenant] shall then quit and surrender the Premises to
[Landlord].
Respondent's Brief at 25-26 (citing to para. 13 of Lease).
"2The "use" clause in the lease reads as follows:
USE AND OCCUPANCY. Lessee shall use and occupy the Premises as
medical offices and for no other purpose. Lessor represents and warrants
that the demised Premises can be lawfully occupied and used as an Article
28, Ambulatory, Surgical or diagnostic and treatment center.
Long Island Gynecological Servs., P.C. v. 1103 Stewart Avenue Assoc., Ltd. Partnership, No. 4890\95, 1995 WL 686571, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Oct. 16, 1995),
rev'd, 638 N.Y.S.2d 959 (2d Dep't 1996) (citing to para. 4 of Lease).
:4 Appellant's Brief at 4-5 (citing to Mar. 3 Morey Aff.).
" Respondent's Brief at 7 (citing to Hearing Tr. at 244).
ig Respondent's Brief at 8 (citing to Hearing Tr. at 33, 80). On one occasion, a
client of the clinic regurgitated in another tenant's office. Id. (citing to Hearing Tr.
at 81). On yet another occasion, a client of the clinic changed her baby's diaper in a
neighboring tenant's waiting room. Id. (citing to Hearing Tr. at 92, 250).
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and interfering with the smooth operation of their businesses.'
On June 28, 1994, in response to these numerous complaints, the
landlord promulgated a new "waiting room rule" requiring all
tenants to, among other things, "maintain a waiting room sufficient for visitors, guests and/or patients utilizing their space"
and to post a sign advising patients to wait inside certain designated areas.' In response to the new rule, the clinic immediately
posted the requisite sign and hired a security guard to help contain its patients."
Tension among the tenants at 1103 Stewart Avenue intensified as violent anti-abortion protesters began to assemble in
front of the building. Over a period of two years, the clinic and
the other tenants were the victims of at least seventeen separate
incidents of anti-abortion violence.' On January 12, 1995, in re7 Respondent's Brief at 8, 10. One tenant had to lock his office door during
business hours to keep out the loiterers. Id. at 10 (citing to Hearing Tr. at 433).
18 Long Island Gynecological Servs., P.C. v. 1103 Stewart Avenue Assoc., Ltd.
Partnership, No. 4890\95, 1995 WL 68571, at *1. (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Oct. 16,
1995), rev'd, 638 N.Y.S.2d 959 (2d Dep't 1996).
The rule stated in its entirety:
Please be advised that effective immediately, all tenants of 1103
Stewart Avenue will be required to maintain a waiting room sufficient for

visitors, guests and/or patients utilizing their space. In addition, all visitors, guests and/or patients of tenants of 1103 Stewart Avenue will be required to wait either within the space being visited or outside the building.
In order to effectuate the foregoing rule, each tenant will be required to
post a sign in its waiting area containing the following statement 'ALL
VISITORS, GUESTS AND/OR PATIENTS MUST WAIT EITHER IN THE
WAITING AREA OR OUTSIDE THE BUILDING. PLEASE DO NOT
WAIT IN THE COMMON AREAS OF THE BUILDING. THANK YOU.'
This sign shall be prominently displaced [sic] in your waiting area.
Failure to comply with this, or any other rules prescribed by 1103 Stewart
Avenue Associates, L.P. shall constitute a default under each of their respective lease. Failure to cure such default after notice from 1103 Stewart
Avenue Associates, L.P. shall constitute grounds for eviction from 1103
Stewart.

Id.
Appellant's Brief at 7 (citing to Hearing Tr. at 63-65).
"The following seventeen incidents at 1103 Stewart Avenue were documented
by the Nassau County Police Department:

Rae
01/25/94
01/25/94
03/15/94

ha=
Assault/2nd degree-led to arrest.
Harassment/2nd degree-Landlords Greg Morey and
John Caracciolo physically attacked.
Criminal Mischief/2nd degree-Shots fired at building
window.
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sponse to these incidents, the landlord promulgated a second
new rule, the "safety rule," which prohibited any tenant of 1103
Stewart Avenue from engaging in any activity "which, in and of
itself or through the related activities of others, (1) jeopardize[d]
the safety or property of other tenants, their employees, and/or
invitees or (2) interfere[d] with the comfort, quiet and convenience of all occupants of the Building."'
05/18/94

Criminal Mischief/3rd degree- Shots fired at building
window.
07/10/94
Criminal Mischiefl3rd degree-Lead sinker thrown at
John Caracciolo and through Ron Morey's car window.
08/27/94
Criminal Mischief/2nd degree-Building directory stolen.
09/18/94
Criminal Mischief'2nd degree- Shots fired at building
window.
10/10/94
Assaultl3rd degree-Employee of 2nd floor tenant
attacked. Victim exited elevator and was accosted
from behind by two unknown subjects who dragged her
down hall and slammed her into a wall several times and
knocked her to the ground. Victim was dressed in a
white nurse's uniform and was probably thought to be an
abortion clinic worker, when in fact, she was not.
10/22/94
Criminal Mischief/2nd degree- Shots fired at building
window.
11/27/94
Criminal Mischief/2nd degree-BB gun shots fired at
station van window.
01/04195
Aggravated Harassmentl2nd degree-Bomb scare/false
report .
01/07/95
Aggravated Harassment/2nd degree-Threatening notes.
posted on building stating "Danger. This is a war zone.
People are being killed here-like Boston. You risk
injury or death if you are caught near these premises."
01/11/95
Bomb Scare/false report
01/12/95
Criminal Mischief/3rd degree-Tenant's office door glued
shut.
01/31/95
Harassment/2nd degree-Chicken livers found on 2nd
floor.
02/15/95
Trespassing-Led to arrest.
02/15/95
Trespassing-Led to arrest.
Long Island Gynecological Servs., No. 4890\95, 1995 WL 686571, at *2.
1 The "safety rule" stated in its entirety that:
[n]o tenant of 1103 Stewart Avenue shall engage in any activity (or allow
any activity to be conducted on or in the leased premises) which, in and of
itself or through the related activities of others, (1) jeopardizes the safety
or property of other tenants, their employees, and/or invitees or (2) interferes with the comfort, quiet and convenience of all occupants of the
Building.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule is an emergency
measure which requires immediate compliance. Any tenant's failure to
comply with the foregoing rule can (after expiration of appropriate cure
periods) constitute a default under the tenant's lease and be grounds for
eviction.
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On the same date that the "safety rule" was issued, the
clinic was served with notice that they were in default of both
the "waiting room rule" and the "safety rule" and was given Yellowstone days to cure the default or risk eviction.' Thirty-one
days later, the cure period expired and the clinic was served with
a Notice of Termination and given ten days to vacate the premises.' Nine days later, the clinic filed for Yellowstone injunctive
relief. 4
The New York State Supreme Court denied the clinic's motion for a Yellowstone injunction after a plenary hearing found
that both the "waiting room rule" and the "safety rule" were reasonably prescribed.' The New York State Supreme Court, ApId. at *1-*2.
It is important to note that the January 12th "safety rule" retracted a rule delivered by the landlord the previous day which stated, in part, that "effective immediately, no tenant of 1103 Stewart Avenue shall perform any abortions or other
medical services in any way related to pregnancy terminations...." Appellant's Brief
at 10. Although this rule was meant to apply to all tenants, the clinic was the only
abortion provider in the building. Id. (citing to Hearing Tr. at 24). The landlord had
conceded during judicial proceedings that the January 12th rule was promulgated to
"adjust the language" of the January 11th rule while still accomplishing the same
results of prohibiting abortions. Id. at 11-12 (citing to Hearing Tr. at 121-22). The
landlord's own expert witness on commercial leasing and management, testified
that if the purposes of the January 12th rule was the same as the January 11th
rule, prevention of abortions, a permissible activity under the lease, then it was unreasonable. Id. at 12 n.4 (citing to Hearing Tr. at 423-24). In essence, according to
the "safety rule", the tenant was in default of the leas6 if, in response to the abortion
procedures performed by the clinic, anti-abortion protesters victimized or harassed
the other tenants of the building. See supra note 20.
Long Island Gynecological Servs., No. 4890\95, 1995 WL 686571, at *2. At the
hearing, the landlord's expert testified that it was unusual to simultaneously issue a
new building rule and a default notice of the same rule. Appellant's Brief at 12
(citing to Hearing Tr. at 513).
2 The Notice of Termination stated that "by the continued performance of
abortion procedures, you have continued to place in jeopardy the safety and propand caused their comfort, quiet and convenience to be intererty of other tenants ...
fered with." Respondent's Brief at 17. The landlord conceded that LIGS' only violation of the "safety rule" was the continued performance of abortion procedures.
Appellant's Brief at 16 (citing to Hearing Tr. at 123).
24 Long Island Gynecological Servs., P.C. v. 1103 Stewart Ave. Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 638 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (2d Dep't 1996).
Long Island Gynecological Servs., No. 4890\95, 1995 WL 68571, at *3.A temporary restraining order was granted to the tenant. Id. The New York Supreme
Court then ordered a plenary hearing to determine the reasonableness of the rules
prescribed by landlord. Appellant's Brief at 17. The court found the rules to be reasonably prescribed to prevent physical harm from being inflicted on other tenants
and made no determination on the issue of the Yellowstone injunction. Long Island
Gynecological Servs., No. 4890\95, 1995 WL 686571, at *3.This ruling allowed the
landlord to commence eviction proceedings and rendered the tenant without remedy
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pellate Division, Second Department, in an opinion by Judge
Mangano, reversed the Supreme Court's finding and held that
the clinic was entitled to a Yellowstone injunction and that the
"safety rule" was not reasonably prescribed."' The court began its
opinion by noting that an application for a Yellowstone injunction
must be sought before the tenant's cure period expires and before
the landlord terminates the lease or the application is considered
untimely and the "court [is divested] of its power to grant a Yellowstone injunction .. 27 The court observed, however, that the
lease itself provided for an extended cure period if the default
could not "be completely cured within thirty (30) days and [the
tenant] thereafter proceed[ed] with reasonable diligence and in
good faith to cure such default."'
The court reasoned that
though the thirty-day cure period had expired, the Yellowstone
injunction should have been granted because the clinic
"successfully demonstrated that it could not completely cure its
alleged defaults within the thirty-day cure period ...[and] was
therefore entitled to more [time]."'
The court also found that the "safety rule" inherently prevented abortion procedures, thereby unilaterally modifying and
altering the lease in violation of contract law." The "safety rule,"
therefore, could not "be used as a predicate for holding the tenant in default."3' The legitimacy of the "waiting room" rule was
not at issue in this appeal.
It is submitted that the Appellate Division ruled irfcorrectly
to prevent forfeiture of the leasehold. Id.; see also Mann Theatres Corp. of Cal. v.
Mid-Island Shopping Plaza Co., 94 A.D.2d 466, 475-76, 464 N.Y.S.2d 793, 800-01 (2d
Dep't 1983), affid, 62 N.Y.2d 930, 468 N.E.2d 51, 479 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1984) (noting
that without Yellowstone injunction tenant's lease could automatically be forfeited
without further opportunity to cure).
26 Long Island Gynecological Serus., 638 N.Y.S.2d at 962. The "reasonableness"
of the "waiting room rule" was not contested by the tenant upon appeal. Id.
2'7
Id. (citations omitted).
2' Id.; see also supra note 12 which sets out the default provision in full.
Long Island Gynecological Servs., 638 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
3' Id. at 962-63; see also Lundberg v. Board of Educ. of Gloversville Enlarged
Sch. Dist., 127 Misc. 2d 804, 806, 487 N.Y.S.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Fulton
County 1985) (noting that unilateral alterations of contracts are not binding on
other party); Shore Terrace Realty Assocs. v. Smosna, 115 Misc. 2d 581, 585, 454
N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1982) (noting landlord may not
unilaterally alter written lease unless lease expressly provided for such contingency); 1020 Park Ave., Inc. v. Raynor, 97 Misc. 2d 288, 289, 411 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (holding that lease options "cannot be unilaterally
altered or revoked").
"'Long Island Gynecological Servs., 638 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
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in granting the Yellowstone injunction to the clinic because the
clinic did not meet the requisite requirement of timeliness.32 The
court interpreted the default clause in the lease as granting an
extension of the time period during which the clinic was required
to seek an injunction.' It is submitted that this default was curable within thirty days and as such, the tenant was required to
seek injunctive relief before the end of the cure period.' Further,
even if the clinic had believed that the default could not be cured
within thirty days and that the landlord was frustrating their efforts to cure, the ambiguous language of the terms of the lease
did not excuse the clinic from taking affirmative, timely steps to
protect the leasehold within the thirty day time period prescribed by the Default Notice itself.' By allowing the clinic to receive injunctive relief beyond the traditional time limitations,
the court is revising the threshold requirements of the Yellowstone injunction which are embedded in precedent." It is submitted that the need for judicial stability and clarity in the law is
32 See

supra note 3 and accompanying text.

See Long Island Gynecological Servs., 638 N.Y.S.2d at 962; see also supra note
12 (setting forth default clause in its entirety). The court reasoned that because the

landlord frustrated the tenant's efforts to expeditiously cure the default, the tenant
was entitled to an extended cure period. Long Island Gynecological Servs., 638
N.Y.S.2d at 962.
' See Respondenfs Brief at 32, 33 (noting that tenant could have reduced its
business volume or rescheduled appointments to avoid overcrowding). The tenant's
attorney argued that tenant was in full compliance with both the Waiting Room
Rule and the Safety Rule. See id. Notably, however, it was suggested that installation of video surveillance cameras would not have ultimately solved the problem of
inadequate waiting room space and overbooking by the clinic. Nevertheless, no suggestion was made that the rules could not be complied with within the prescribed 30
day cure period and consequently no extension of the cure period was ever requested from the landlord. Id. at 33 (citing Affidavit of clinic manager Gail Fink,
sworn to on Feb. 21, 1995); cf. David Frey, The Yellowstone Injunction, or "How to
Vex Your Landlord Without Really Trying", 58 BROOK L. REV. 155, 173 (1992)
(stating that many Yellowstone tenants could have cured violations at little cost
within prescribed cure period).
3' See Respondent's Brief at 17 (citing to Notice of Default which gave tenant 30
days to cure); see also id. at 34 (noting tenant consistently maintained it was not in
violation of new rules and therefore would not have needed extended time period to
cure); S.E. Nichols, Inc. v. American Shopping Ctrs., 115 A.D.2d 856, 858, 495
N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (3d Dep't 1985) (explaining that "there is no basis for preliminary
injunctive relief where the injunction is not sought until after expiration of the cure
period and after a termination notice has been served"); Health 'N Sports, Inc. v.
Providence Capitol Realty Group, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 884, 885, 428 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289
(2d Dep't 1980) (noting tenants failure to seek Yellowstone injunction within cure
period divested court of power to grant stay).
" See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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more compelling than extending the cure period for a controversial tenant in a well-publicized case based upon nothing more
than the ambiguous boiler plate language of the lease and judicial sympathy." The court's interpretation of the ambiguous language of the default clause and its subsequent ruling leads to instability and uncertainty in the context of landlord/tenant law.
It is further submitted that the court reached the correct
conclusion in ruling that the "safety rule" was not reasonably
prescribed because it unilaterally modified the lease by prohibiting abortions." The court did not, however, sufficiently expand
on its definition of "reasonableness.""' If, for example, the "safety
rule" did not blatantly restrict abortions, would the rule have
been held "reasonable" even though it made the tenant responsible for the criminal actions of third parties?" New York courts
'" See Holy Properties Ltd., L.P. v. Kenneth Cole Prod., Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 130, 134,
661 N.E.2d 694, 696, 637 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966 (1995) (noting that in area of real property law, certainty of established rules is premier and not to be lightly cast aside);
First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Ctr., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630, 638, 237
N.E.2d 868, 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721, 725 (1968) (noting judicial sympathy must not
undermine stability in the law).
38 Long Island Gynecological Servs., P.C. v. 1103 Stewart Ave. Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 638 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (2d Dep't 1996).
39 The court only held that the "safety rule" was not reasonably
prescribed because it unilaterally modified the lease in violation of contract law. Id.
4 To hold a tenant liable for the criminal acts of third parties would have ramifications much more far-reaching than abortion providers-all tenants who are the
targets of illegal actions would be affected. See Appellant's Brief at 33 (noting that
fur coat retailer could be evicted due to violent animal rights protesters and battered women could be evicted because of violent mate); amicus curiae brief of New
York Clinic Defense Task Force at 18 (No. 95-10358, 95-10986) (suggesting that
landlord could evict government agency because of threat of violence from antigovernment militants); see also Protests Aren't Cause for Eviction, NEWSDAY, Feb.
23, 1996, at A46 (suggesting every tenant would be vulnerable to eviction because of
"anyone with a gripe or a grudge"); Priscilla J. Smith, Clinic Ruling Plays Into Terrorism, NEWSDAY, Nov. 8, 1995, at A37 (noting judiciary must send message that
society will punish the aggressor and not the victim); Warren Strugatch, Judge's
Ruling In Eviction Sparks Debate, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1995, at DOI (noting LIGS
Supreme Court decision may be used as excuse to terminate leases of tenants associated with feminism or gay rights causes). But see John T. McQuiston, NY Judge
Allows Landlord's Eviction of Abortion Clinic, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 12,
1995, at 41A (quoting anti-abortion right activist as saying she hoped same rationale
behind Supreme Court decision in LIGS could be used to close down other abortion
providers); Smith, supra, at A37 (noting logic of anti-abortion violence is to intimidate until ultimately there will be no one willing to conduct abortions).
The ramifications of the LIGS decision on both abortion providers and their patients have been discussed in several recent articles. See Ruth Ann Leach, Show
O.J. A Few Photos Of His Battered Ex-wife, NASHVILLE BANNER, Nov. 2, 1995, at
A15 (stating that Supreme Court's decision signifies that "anti-abortion forces can
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have consistently held that the criminal acts of third parties
cannot be the basis for terminating a tenant's lease.4' The LIGS
court, however, never mentioned this as a factor in their analysis
of "reasonableness." The case at bar provided ample opportunity
for the court to take a strong public policy stance and fashion a
clear cut standard against tenant liability for criminal actions of
third parties.' It is submitted that the court should have expanded its analysis of "reasonableness" and unequivocally held
that any rule holding a tenant liable for the criminal actions of a
third party is inherently "unreasonable" and void as against
public policy.'
Violent anti-abortion protests have increased over the past
decade causing turmoil in many landlord/tenant relationships.get what they want if they[] use criminal tactics to frighten tenants and landlords");
ProtestsAren't Cause for Eviction, supra, at A46 (stating that effect of appellate decision in LIGS will be to prevent landlords from voiding valid leases due to threats
from abortion opponents); Smith, supra at A37 (arguing that ruling in favor of
landlord will hand extremist anti-abortion protesters a victory in "their war of attrition"); Strugatch, supra, at D01 (addressing fact that if Supreme Court decision
in LIGS was upheld all tenants could be at risk of their premises because of action
of outsiders).
4 See Kings County Dist. Attorney's Office v. Freshley, 160 Misc.2d 302, 309,
608 N.Y.S.2d 788, 792-93 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1993) (holding that illegal activity within tenant's premises did not warrant eviction); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Burdo,
69 Misc. 2d 153, 158-59, 329 N.Y.S.2d 742, 749 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1972)
(stating "where it can be shown that tenant was not involved with the criminal activities nor acquiesced to their continuance, eviction is not justified"); Humane Soc'y
v. Joad Enter., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 8, 9, 316 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. New York
County 1970) (holding that "rt]he fact that several people were arrested on the respondent's premises for criminal acts committed without the respondent's knowledge or acquiescence will not justify a forfeiture of the lease").
Further, in Giuffre v. Wisconsin Women's Health Care Ctr., S.C., a landlord
moved for summary eviction proceedings against an abortion clinic tenant because
of disturbances created by anti-abortion protesters. 180 Wisc. 2d 471, 514 N.W.2d 55
(1993). The court refused to grant the landlord the eviction, noting that abortions
are a legal activity and were permitted under the lease and that the tenant "cannot
be held responsible for the behavior of third parties who are neither their guests nor
by any stretch of the imagination invitees." Id.
42 The court was being watched closely by both
fronts of the abortion debate to
see if violent, terrorist-like tactics really could serve as a basis to have a tenant
evicted. See supra note 40.
"See supra note 40.
See United States v. Cooley, 787 F. Supp. 977, 989 (D. Kan. 1992) (noting
anti-abortion protesters threatened escorts and guards with physical harm "while
other persons in the crowd climbed the clinic's fences and charged the gate"); Fargo
Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Lambs of Christ, 488 N.W.2d 401, 405 (N.D. 1992)
(noting anti-abortion protesters scaled walls and fences surrounding parking lot and
simultaneously charged police guarding gate to abortion clinic); Roni Rabin, Study:
Clinics Under Fire Bill Seeks To Halt Attacks on Abortion Centers, NEWSDAY, Nov.
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Both landlords and tenants should be accorded the right to rely
upon established precedent and succinct opinions in order to
clearly understand their rights and responsibilities under the
law.45 The LIGS court failed to provide stable guidance to meet

this end. Perhaps future litigation will result in the promulgation of a clear cut standard needed to reaffir stability in landlord/tenant jurisprudence.
Jane A. Hartman

5, 1993, at 17 (stating half of abortion clinics responding to national survey were
victims of death threats, bomb threats, chemical attacks, arson and blockades in
1993); Smith, supra note 40, at A37 (noting four abortion clinic workers were killed
and seven were seriously injured in 1994); see also S. REP. No. 103-117, at 8 (1993)
(noting that in Michigan, fourteen clinics were attacked with butyric acid within two
week period and, in San Diego, five clinics "were sprayed with butyric acid, causing
four people to be taken to hospitals").
45 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

